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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.1.\Y~E \\'ETHERELL CHASE, 
Plaint ijj"-Appclla11f, 
-vs.-
~~ll\\'IX .\~lOS < ~HA~E, JR., 
/)('fend a 11 t-U cs pan dent. 
Case 
No. 9919 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an order made as a result of 
an Order to Show Cause. The court, by its action, de-
prived the plaintiff, the mother, of the custody of her two-
Yl'ar-old rhild. One of the questions involved is whether 
the evidenre justified this separation. Also involved is 
the question of the propriety of terminating the require-
nwnt that deft'ndant pay plaintiff the sum of $60.00 per 
month a~ child support and the propriety of denying 
plaintiff any attorney fees for her defense of the Order 
tn Show Cause. 
DISPOSITIOX IX LOWER COURT 
Thi~ case was tried to the court on May 6, 1963, on 
defendant·~ Order to Show Cause and plaintiff's Affidavit 
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and Motion for Attorney Fees. From an Order in favor 
of Defendant, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Judgment and Order 
and judgment in her favor as a matter of law and equity, 
or that failing, a new hearing before an unbiased judge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Jane Wetherell Chase, and the defend-
ant, Edwin Amos Chase, Jr., were married at Nephi, 
Utah, on the 29th day of August, 1958. (R-2) They 
had two children born as issue of the marriage : Richard 
Edwin Chase, who died on the 14th day of October, 1959, 
and Robert Leon Chase, a boy, born October 10, 1960, 
who survives and who was two years and seven months 
old at the time of the hearing of the Order to Show 
Cause (Tr. 4). 
The evidence and record shows that the defendant, 
prior to the divorce, came home intoxicated, left the plain-
tiff for considerable periods of time, left plaintiff to her 
own means of support for months at a time and remained 
absent from the residence of the parties for months at 
a time (R-17). It further shows that at the time of di-
vorce the plaintiff contemplated employment in Salt 
Lake City at a salary in excess of $300.00 per month 
(R-15, 16) which employment she obtained and has con-
tinued at until the date of the Order to Show Cause (Tr. 
56). While plaintiff was working she made arrangements 
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ft,r the infant rhild to stay with his maternal grandmother 
in ~Pphi rrr. ;>7) Where She Visited him every Weekend 
f1·om Friday night to tlw late hours of Sunday (Tr. 57). 
Tht> undi:-4putl'd evidence of plaintiff showed that she 
could not obtain nursery care for the child until he was 
two yPnrs old (Tr. 57) and that she intended to, and did, 
bring the child to Salt Lake City to reside with her and 
her present husband in November of 1962 (Tr. 58), when 
he wns just a few days older than two years of age. 
The C'ddence shows that the defendant did not wish 
the child to be taken to Salt Lake City although he denied 
that he pleaded or begged plaintiff not to take the child 
with lwr as plaintiff testified (Tr. 58 and 19) but ad-
mittl'd that he asked her not to take the child away. 
At no time was there any claim whatsoever that 
plaintiff wns in any way unfit nor was any claim made 
that the child had not received excellent care. Defend-
nut testified that the plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Wetherell, 
was "exrellent to him" (Tr. 12 and 23) and that the 
child remained with Mrs. Wetherell at his request 
(Tr. 23). 
Defendant testified that he had remarried (Tr. 4-5), 
that he has another child eight months of age and that 
he is a cook who works from 4 :00 a.m. to 11 :00 a.m. and 
from 6 :00 to 7 :30 p.m. seven days each week for which 
work he earns approximately $500.00 per month before 
deductions are taken from his wages (Tr. 5-6). He tes-
tified also that he lived with his wife and child in a 
duplex and that his present wife loved the child. 
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The plaintiff testified that she had remarried also 
and resides with her present husband in Salt Lake Citr 
at 1603 Wilson Avenue and that she is employed, as i~ 
her husband, and that she earns $390.00 per month and 
her husband earns $500.00 or $600.00 per month (Tr. 
55-56). She further testified that she and her husband 
would be free from debt in October, 1963, and she could 
remain home with her child (Tr. 56-58). Since the di-
vorce of the parties, the plaintiff has been extremely 
faithful in making trips to Nephi on nearly every week-
end to visit with her child (Tr. 57) and has provided 
the medical care necessary to repair a double hernia 
which the child suffered (Tr. 71). The child ·was taken to 
Salt Lake City in November of 1962 (Tr. 58-59) andre-
turned to Nephi a pproximatley one week later as a result 
of an emotional appeal made by plaintiff's mother (Tr. 
59-60). During the time he was in Salt Lake City he was 
kept during the day in a reputable day nursery (Tr. 55) 
and was cared for at night by his mother. Absolutely 
no evidence was presented which would indicate that 
he did not receive excellent care except the opinion evi-
dence of defendant that it wasn't good for the child to 
be put in a nursery (Tr. 24). Both spouses of the parties 
testified they had feelings of love and affection for the 
child. Defendant's wife stated she loved him (Tr. 37-38) 
and plaintiff's husband stated he felt "as if he were 
my own son" (Tr. 65). The wife of defendant, however, 
showed by her testimony (Tr. 41) that she has endeavored 
to roach the child not to care for his mother and further 
testified that prior to the birth of her child, who is de-
fendant's child, that she had to call the "beer joints" for 
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clt•ft·ndant to come home because she was afraid to stay 
nlone (Tr. 42-43) but that since she had given birth to 
ht·r duughtPr she was not afraid to stay home and her 
hu~band, thP defendant, stays out two or three nights a 
\WPk plnyi11g pool because "he works hard" and "that 
dol·~u·t hurt him." (Tr. 43) 
The defendant's employer testified, over plaintiff's 
objl•etion, that defendant had a good business reputation 
in tlw community (Tr. 47). He further testified that he 
and defendant played pool together ''night after night'' 
(Tr. 47), and that defendant owed him no obligation (Tr. 
4S). Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he had 
been "obligated to Ray for the last two years" (Tr. 5). 
The court, in its order dated May 8, 1963, stated that 
plaintiff'~ parents "rescued" the child from a. nursery 
and furth('r stated that the word "rescued" was used 
"advis('dly" (R-29) and also made much of the fact that 
defendant's present wife is a. "very personable young 
woman" (R-28) who will "be 20 years of age next 
month·· (R-28). The court further stated that the child 
""ill be better off by having a more stable home envir-
onment and the care and attention of parents who love 
and care for him in their home than under the present 
conditions.'' (R-29) 
The Order awarding defendant the custody of the 
child and terminating payments for support of the child 
was entered accordingly. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CUS-
TODY OF THE MINOR CHILD, ROBERT 
LEON CHASE, TO THE DEFENDANT. 
Although a divorced mother has no absolute right 
to the custody of minor children under U.C.A. 1953, 
30-3-10, the policy of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah has been to give weight to the view that, all things 
being equal, preference should be given to the mother in 
awarding custody of a child of tender years. 
In the case of Briggs v. Briggs, 11 Utah 418, 181 
Pac. 2d 223, the court held in a habeas corpus proceeding 
between divorced parents for the custody of a child under 
ten years of age that where there was no claim that the 
mother was immoral or incompetent, she was entitled to 
the custody of the child unless it was made to appear that 
she was an improper person, and the burden of so show-
ing was on the father. This was not shown in this case 
and, as a matter of fact, there was absolutely no evidence 
showing that the mother was anything other than a fine, 
decent person. 
To award the custody of a child to another woman, 
who would be in charge of the child during nearly all his 
waking hours, rather than to the natural mother is un-
natural and abhorent. It should be done only when it is 
clearly shown by the evidence that the best interests of 
the child require such an order. This court in the case 
of lVaUon v. Coffrna;n, 110 Utah 1, 169 Pac. 2d 97 said: 
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'' \V e conclude that the determining considera-
tion in eases of this kind is: What will be for the 
ht>~t inh·n·~t and welfare of the child? That in de-
termining this question there is a presumption 
that it will be for the best interest and welfare of 
the child to be reared under the care, custody and 
control of its natural parent; that this presump-
tion is not overcome unless from all the evidence 
the trier of the fact is satisfied that the welfare of 
the child requires that it be awarded to someone 
other than its natural parent. Thus the ultimate 
burden of proof on this question is always in favor 
of the parent and against the other person. 
·'In addition thereto, this presumption being 
based on logic and natural inference, should be 
kept in mind by the trier of the facts and weighed 
and considered with all the other evidence in de-
termining this question. The common experience 
of mankind teaches 'that blood is thicker than 
water,' that usually there is a much stronger at-
tachment between a. natural parent and child than 
is developed between a child and the foster parent, 
that ordinarily the natural parent is willing to sac-
rifice its own interest and welfare for the benefit 
of the rhild much more than is the case with foster 
parents and that generally the natural parent is 
more sympathetic and understanding and better 
able to get the confidence and love of its own child 
than anyone else, all of these things are especially 
tn1e of the natural mother. That these facts should 
always be kept in mind throughout the trial and 
given due weight along with all other evidence in 
the case in determining what will be for the best 
interests and welfare of the child. However this 
' presumption is one of fact and not of law, and may 
be overcome by any competent evidence which is 
suffirient to satisfy a reasonable mind thereon." 
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No claim has been made that the plaintiff is unfit or 
incompetent to care for her own child. There is no evi-
dence to show that she has ever been anything but a lov-
ing, tender, thoughtful and devoted mother. She and her 
husband are much better able to provide financially for 
the child and can better educate and raise the child in 
their home than can the defendant and his young wife 
who is already burdened with the care of an infant of 
her own. There is no question that defendant loves his 
child but he has shown hy his actions in the past that he 
has more liking for pool halls than he has for his home and 
that he leaves his present wife alone with her infant child 
on approximately one-half of the evenings each week. 
Why the court stated that the child was was "res-
cued'' from a nursery school is not explainable. It is 
only logical to believe that association with small children 
of the same age under proper supervision is more bene-
ficial to a child than would be the raising of a child with 
young adults with no opportunity to learn or acquire 
the ability to associate with children of his own age for 
certain periods of time. This, in itself, however, is not 
the determining factor in this case because the plaintiff 
clearly indicated her intention to cease working in the 
near future to devote herself to attending to the duties 
of a debt-fee household in the company of her college-
educated husband and her child. 
The defendant made no complaints regarding the 
manner in which the child was cared for by his maternal 
grandparents and was perfectly willing to have the sit-
uation continue as it was until he found that plaintiff 
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wn~ mnki 11.~ arrangements to have the child live with her 
in lwr home in Halt Lake City and he then suddenly dis-
t•ovPred that he, rather than plaintiff, would be confronted 
with the Pxpense of traveling between Nephi and Salt 
I.~nkP City in order to visit with his child. 
The plaintiff, being the mother of the child, will un-
douhtPdly devote more time to her child, will show it 
g-reater Jon' and affection than would any other person, 
no matter how kind and willing she may be, and in spite 
of the protPstations of defendant's wife that she loves 
the child as much as she loves her own natural child, it 
would be n'ry difficult for a twenty-year-old girl to be 
absolutely impartial in her treatment of this child in the 
event it would deprive her natural child of any material 
and important thing. On the other hand, it is easier for 
a man to accept the responsibility of caring for another 
man's child. This is based on the premise that the greater 
responsibility of caring for a child is placed upon the 
woman. 
The best interests of the child require that he be 
placed with his mother as soon as possible. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING THE 
REQUIRE:JIENT THAT DEFENDANT PAY 
TO PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $60.00 PER 
:JIOXTH FOR THE CARE AND SUPPORT OF 
THE MINOR CHILD. 
The law is well settled and it is obvious that in the 
event plaintiff has custody of the minor child there is a 
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duty of defendant to assist in the support of his own 
child. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
AWARD PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FEES FOR 
HER DEFENSE OF DEFENDANT'S ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE. 
This point is also so well settled that no argument 
is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
The court, in this case, deprived the plaintiff of the 
custody of her two-year-old child with no evidence that 
she was in any way incompetent, improper or morally 
unfit. By devious reasoning which was not based on any 
evidence, a ruling was made which seemed to base a de-
privation of a mother's right to custody of her child on 
the basis that it was in some way unnatural to place a 
child in a nursery school, and in some way so detrimen-
tal to the welfare of the child that he should be taken 
away from the mother permanently. 
The evidence sustains the finding that the plaintiff 
loves her child, is willing to love and care for the child 
and make sacrifices for him, and that she has always 
done so in the past. Plaintiff will love the child more 
and make more efforts in its behalf than can be expected 
of a step-mother, who is little more than a child herself. 
Plaintiff is ready, willing and able to make all sacri-
10 
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fir£'s which a n• necessary to provide a comfortable, se-
<·un· and loving home life for her child. 
On the basis of the evidence and the obvious facts, 
tlw Order of tlw Dist rirt Court granting custody to the 
defendant should be reversed and the father should be 
ordered to eontribute to the support of his child. Plain-
tiff should further be allowed attorney fees not only for 
the hearing in the District Court but also for this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALAN H. BISHOP 
343 South State Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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